Following a month of relative calm in August, the United States resumed its strikes in Iran, Tehran retaliated against U.S. bases in the Middle East, and the Houthis now control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. While these military operations appear measured so far, this escalation threatens to plunge the region into a new cycle of violence due to the persistent stalemate in U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
In actuality, Donald Trump is caught between two constraints: continuing the war would entail significant costs, but ending it without a clear outcome would expose him to criticism from a broad section of the American political and media establishment right before the midterm elections. At its core, the issue is that the Trump administration refuses to acknowledge that genuine de-escalation would require certain compromises with Tehran. For now, it favors an “economic war” against Iran, with a new wave of sanctions, this time targeting Tehran’s commercial partners; covering gold, technology, digital assets, aviation, and maritime transport. Yet, it is clear that China, Russia, and India in particular, will not comply with these new restrictions.
Furthermore, the complication with this strategy is that for Tehran, the primary objective is the survival of the regime, regardless of economic and financial sanctions, threats of destruction, or military conflicts. The ruling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would prefer to fight to the end rather than surrender, as their future is tied to that of the regime. Moreover, Iran appears convinced that it holds the upper hand over the United States and that, over time, Washington’s political resolve will weaken first.
The reality is that toppling the Iranian regime would require time, sustained political commitment, the capacity to absorb human losses, major economic costs, and vast military resources. However, the Gulf states, which are the primary victims of the conflict, do not believe the Trump administration is prepared to commit to such an effort. This explains their frustration and skepticism regarding the rationale of continuing to host U.S. military installations in the region, which serve as direct targets for Tehran. These states feel more vulnerable than before the war, and their economies have been severely impacted, albeit to varying degrees: heavily in Qatar and Dubai, and less so elsewhere… Until strikes by pro-Iranian Iraqi militias on the Saudi pipeline lead to Yanbu temporarily halted Saudi petroleum exports. The conclusion drawn by these countries is that U.S. protection remains indispensable, yet it is now insufficient. This prompted Saudi Arabia to sign a defense agreement with Pakistan and Turkey on August 7 in order to diversify its security options.
Tehran did not view this pact unfavorably, as it reflects in some ways the end of the U.S. monopoly in the Gulf and paves the way for a potential arrangement among regional powers. While the GCC states have every reason to remain distrustful of the Tehran regime, Iran remains their neighbor, and they are acutely aware of their vulnerability to its disruptive capabilities. As for the Islamic Republic, it is satisfied to see its neighbors gradually move away from Washington’s oversight. Furthermore, the conflict has granted it a powerful deterrent weapon through the blockading of the Strait of Hormuz, and it is currently increasing pressure by encouraging Yemen’s Houthis to disrupt maritime traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
In short, President Trump is attempting to exit a conflict in which nothing he hoped for materialized, while almost everything he sought to avoid came to pass.
Iran, on the other hand, appears more determined than Washington to prolong the conflict and capitalize on the current political and economic climate in the U.S. and globally to extract strategic advantages from a series of American miscalculations and missteps. Under current circumstances, the mutual lack of trust is so deep, and the disparities in perception regarding the strategic outcome of the conflict and the relative balance of power are so vast, that achieving real progress in negotiations is virtually impossible, despite efforts by Pakistan and the Gulf states. Only China, the main buyer of Iranian crude, would hold leverage over Tehran, as it seeks lower crude prices and secure maritime routes; but will Beijing (and Moscow) act to rescue the United States from the quagmire into which Netanyahu dragged Trump? Indeed, the erosion of American credibility supports the anti-Western campaigns of both nations.
In the meantime, even if neither American nor Iranian leaders desire a broader confrontation, the current diplomatic impasse suggests we may be heading toward a “new normal” characterized by tit-for-tat retaliatory strikes that resolve nothing, only heightening tensions and prolonging the conflict. Will upcoming elections in the United States and Israel change the dynamic? Will the Chinese attempt to act as mediators? One can hope, but nothing is certain.
At this stage, several initial conclusions are already emerging:
- The upheavals arising from this war are profound, reshaping dynamics and weakening the U.S.-led order in the region. The Abraham Accords are currently a casualty of this conflict.
- Israel’s hegemonic stance and its abandonment of any willingness to compromise with the Palestinians isolate the country and undermine Trump’s vision of an “Arab-Israeli NATO” against Iran, as regional powers now harbor distrust toward both neighbors. Nevertheless, Trump’s vacillations lead them to cooperate more or less discreetly with Israel on security matters.
- The Israeli-American war has resulted in placing the Strait of Hormuz under the control of their Iranian adversaries, and establishing alternative petroleum export routes will require considerable time.
- While Gulf countries envision a future where the Iranian regime is gone, pragmatic reality leads them de facto to now hope for internal reform within the existing regime.
- Iran aims to impose a new regional security architecture featuring stabilized relations with its Arab neighbors, ideally while asserting dominance over them, facilitated by a reduced U.S. military presence. Does it, however, possess the means to achieve this?
- On the economic front, the region is shipping less than half of its pre-war oil volume. Over the past six months, a fragile equilibrium has emerged between reduced supply, weakened demand (particularly from China), and the drawdown of stockpiles; this has cushioned the oil shock, though the balance remains precarious.
The Middle East is undergoing a comprehensive strategic realignment. However, the outcome of these ongoing shifts remains uncertain, and prolonged tensions cannot be ruled out for at least a certain period of time.
