We are approaching the midterm elections in Washington without a single tangible foreign policy success in recent months. The mediations that brought prestige to this White House now feel distant: the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, which the Indians were quick to deny, the end of hostilities between Cambodia and Thailand, the agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and last October’s Gaza truce. This past semester already feels remote. Since then, the war in Iran has consumed Washington’s focus, while the conflict in Ukraine has dragged on, monotonous and bloody.
The numbers are staggering. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Russia suffered between 30,000 and 34,000 casualties per month this year, exceeding its recruitment capacity. The military casualties of both armies combined have already passed two millions. In exchange for this slaughter, Russian forces advance by 50, 70, or 90 meters a day, one of the slowest paces recorded in a century of warfare. Moscow controls roughly 80% of Donetsk. Ukraine continues to resist, striking Russian refineries and occasionally retaking positions in Zaporizhzhia. Neither side can impose its political goals through military force.
It is not just equipment that is being consumed in these trenches; it is the future generations of two European nations. Russian demographics, already struggling before 2022, will not recover for decades. Ukraine’s demographics, devastated by death and the exile of millions, will not either. The United States is beginning to realize that this does not serve its interests: not the chronic instability on the continent, nor the perpetual market uncertainty, nor a ruined Russia that becomes ever more reliant on China. The real beneficiary of this war is neither in Moscow nor in Kyiv, but in Beijing, which buys cheap oil while watching the West drain its arsenals.
First: A Narrow Window of opportunity
A narrow window of opportunity exists. On September 5, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met for over three hours with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. The following day, they traveled to Kyiv, their first visit to the Ukrainian capital. On Tuesday the 8th, Trump and Putin spoke by phone in what the Kremlin described as a candid conversation. Discussions are underway to restore a trilateral format and pursue a winter de-escalation by mutually suspending attacks on energy infrastructure.
Volodymyr Zelensky was explicit: September and October are the only options. The underlying hurdles remain unchanged: the status of Donetsk, Kyiv’s Atlantic ambitions, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and above all, the security guarantees Washington is willing to sign. It is worth remembering that on the very night the envoys left Ukraine, Moscow launched another massive bombardment on Kyiv. Reagan summarized it best when negotiating with the Soviets: “trust, but verify.”
On September 23, 2026, on the sidelines of the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The UN gathering also featured a UN Security Council meeting on Ukraine and a Crimea summit hosted by the Ukrainian president, proving that the issue remains front and center. Furthermore, Marco Rubio announced that Vladimir Putin would be invited by Donald Trump to the G20 summit in Miami this December. Could this invitation, though unofficial for now, move negotiations forward?
Second: Worthy Negotiators
Witkoff arrived as a special envoy for the Middle East and ended up handling conflicts for the entire globe. A businessman without formal diplomatic experience has proven to be a skillful, discreet, and at times brilliant negotiator. He is the exception that proves the rule. None of his interlocutors, whether allies, adversaries, or neutral parties, have ever spoken ill of him, which in this field is far more than an anecdote but a credential. Donald Trump himself recalled offering him the job by asking if he wanted to be a Kissinger who doesn’t leak.
With Kushner, understandable doubts existed: youth, inexperience, and his status as the president’s son-in-law. The Abraham Accords dispelled them. I listened to his address last October 11 at Hostages Square in Tel Aviv before 400,000 people, an unscripted speech delivered without notes. It impressed me. There was no swagger, no arrogance, no victory lap: just genuine empathy for those suffering, including explicit mention of the pain felt by the people of Gaza. I was surprised, and pleasantly so.
Third: Slamming the Fist on the Table
What is missing is slamming the fist on the table, and only the president can do that. Trump attributed the gridlock to personal animosity between Putin and Zelensky, a convenient but false explanation. What is missing is not chemistry between two men, but sustained resolve from the world’s leading power. The Financial Times reported on September 9 that the White House was considering replacing its two envoys and reassigning shuttle diplomacy to CIA Director John Ratcliffe, a report later denied by the White House.
Rumors have also circulated regarding Witkoff’s health and potential stepping down, though no official source has confirmed them. Changing negotiators solves nothing if the underlying approach remains unchanged. The president must stop spreading himself thin across twenty simultaneous fronts, confront Putin using the only language he understands—biting sanctions, frozen Russian assets redirected to assist Kyiv, and an uninterrupted supply of air defense systems—while urging Zelensky to accept the realistic boundaries shaped by the front lines. Meanwhile, Europe should be at this table. It is absent because it chose not to pay for its own security, and those who do not pay do not make decisions. That is the cost of two decades of strategic frivolity.
None of this means rewarding aggression. No peace that legitimizes territorial conquest through force will be lasting, acceptable, nor worth it. Kissinger taught that an international order endures only when built on a balance of power accepted as legitimate by all sides. That balance requires Ukraine to remain armed, viable, and firmly anchored in the West, and for Moscow to understand that it will not achieve through attrition what it failed to gain on the battlefield. Churchill is often quoted as ‘saying that jaw-jaw is better than war-war’. He was right, provided talking does not simply buy time for the aggressor.
Four and a half years have passed since February 2022. The clock is ticking against Ukraine on the front lines, against Russia on the home front, and against Trump on the electoral calendar. Rarely do so many pressing deadlines converge. It would be unforgivable to squander them.
By Gustavo de Aristegui
