Europeans and Canadians have good reason to watch the American midterm elections closely. They also have good reason to resist the comforting idea that a Republican defeat will restore the relationship they once knew. November may change who controls Congress. It cannot, by itself, settle the larger argument about America’s place in the world and Canada’s new relationship with its once closest ally and trading partner.
The practical question is how much room Donald Trump will have to govern during his final two years, and where he will choose to exercise it. A president blocked on domestic legislation may devote more attention to trade and foreign policy, where executive authority gives him greater freedom. For America’s allies, a weakened Trump could still be a disruptive one.
With the November 3 midterm vote approaching, Democrats are favoured to regain control of the House of Representatives. The Senate remains more difficult, although the range of competitive races has widened. Republicans hold a 53–47 Senate majority, so Democrats need a net gain of four seats because Vice President JD Vance can break a 50–50 tie.
The political pressure is straightforward. Voters who returned Trump to office expecting relief from high prices are judging his record. His trade policies and the war with Iran have complicated that promise, bringing the costs of foreign policy into household budgets. An early-October AP-NORC poll put approval of his economic management at 26 per cent and his handling of living costs at just 17 per cent. Those are dangerous numbers for the governing party.
Yet dissatisfaction with Trump does not automatically translate into confidence in Democrats. Republicans will try to make the election a choice between competing agendas, rather than a judgment on the president alone. Democrats need their candidates to appeal beyond their activist base, particularly where voters remain culturally conservative or skeptical of government.
The Senate makes that challenge especially clear. Maine and North Carolina offer Democratic opportunities, while Michigan is a seat they must defend. Ohio, Iowa, Alaska and Texas test how far an unfavourable national climate can erode Republican advantages. Candidate quality and local credibility can decide contests that look similar in national polling.
Three things deserve attention in the closing week: whether economic dissatisfaction translates into turnout, whether Republicans can mobilize Trump supporters when he is absent from the ballot, and whether Democrats keep their message focused on voters’ immediate concerns. The House and Senate can deliver different answers. Global allies should prepare for several outcomes.
For European and Canadian readers accustomed to parliamentary government, the first distinction is essential: losing Congress does not remove the president. Trump’s term continues until January 2029. The newly elected Congress takes office on January 3, 2027, leaving a short window in which the outgoing majorities can still act.
A Democratic House alone would end the Republicans’ ability to pass legislation on party-line votes through both chambers. Tax changes, spending priorities and other major initiatives would require negotiation. Democrats would also take control of House committees, gaining the ability to hold hearings, pursue investigations and compel testimony, although such efforts can be challenged in court. Administration officials could spend considerably more time publicly defending their decisions.
The power to approve funding would give a Democratic House leverage over the executive. But using it would carry risks. Budget confrontations could produce shutdowns, delayed programmes and uncertainty for contractors. Allies seeking dependable American commitments might find more sympathetic voices in Congress, but still face an unreliable decision timetable.
If Republicans retain the Senate, they will preserve their ability to confirm judges and senior administration appointments. If Democrats also win the Senate, that changes. They could block nominees and force negotiations over vacancies, including any Supreme Court opening. Senate control therefore matters well beyond the next legislative session.
A Senate-only Democratic victory would produce its own version of divided government. Republicans would retain the House agenda, while Democrats could block legislation and appointments in the upper chamber. Either chamber can obstruct a president’s legislative programme. Only the Senate can deny confirmation.
Even with both chambers, Democrats would face limits. Trump could veto their legislation, and an override would require two-thirds support in each chamber. Most Senate legislation also faces a 60-vote threshold to end debate under current rules. If Democrats pursue impeachment, it will not remove the president; conviction requires two-thirds of senators present. A congressional majority would provide substantial checking power, without transferring the presidency.
If Republicans hold both chambers, Trump will claim vindication and retain a much easier legislative path. His party’s margins and internal divisions would still matter, but allies would have little basis to expect a congressional brake.
A Republican defeat could make Trump more transactional, seeking selected agreements to demonstrate continued relevance. It could also encourage confrontation, with executive actions and international disputes providing opportunities to dominate the political agenda. Neither response should be assumed in advance.
The approaching 2028 presidential contest further complicates matters. Republicans considering life after Trump face pressure to distinguish themselves while retaining his supporters. Democrats will debate whether victory justified moderation or a more ambitious programme. For foreign governments, the result could be an expanding cast of influential interlocutors with competing ambitions.
Democratic gains may also not amount to an American endorsement of unrestricted trade. Democrats have their own constituencies demanding domestic manufacturing, procurement preferences and protection from foreign competition. Canada learned this when the Biden administration left in place the tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration. Europe and Canada should distinguish opposition to Trump’s methods from opposition to the economic nationalism behind them.
For Canada, the immediate priority will be to turn congressional access into a stronger defence of integrated North American production. Following Washington’s decision against extending USMCA at the July review, the agreement remains in force but faces annual reviews. The election will shape the congressional environment around those negotiations, but it will not settle them.
Canadian engagement should reach members from both parties whose constituents depend on cross-border energy, manufacturing and agricultural trade. The strongest argument highlights the American jobs and investment put at risk by disrupting those relationships. That argument gives legislators a reason to act that survives disagreements with Ottawa.
Europe faces a parallel security task. A more receptive Congress could provide additional avenues to defend support for Ukraine and scrutinize the administration’s policy. But congressional support cannot substitute for European ammunition production, military readiness, or the capacity to sustain operations. Appropriations and presidential implementation are separate sources of uncertainty.
Trade also requires caution. Congress has delegated significant tariff authority to presidents under statute. A change in the congressional majority does not automatically repeal those powers or remove existing duties. Reasserting congressional control would require legal and political work, potentially including enough Republican support to overcome a veto.
Europe and Canada should therefore use any opening to deepen practical cooperation: whether through long-term mineral supply agreements, energy infrastructure, or defence procurement that supports production on both sides of the Atlantic. These projects require investment decisions and customers willing to commit. Another declaration of shared values will not build them.
The midterms may create useful constraints on Trump and new opportunities for allies. We should pursue those opportunities. But we should also continue building the industrial and security capabilities that give us greater control over our own decisions.
An American election can improve our circumstances. Our resilience remains our responsibility.
By Erin O’Toole
